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ABSTRACT: According to the different aims of argument in legal activities, this paper argues that legal argument
can be divided into dogmatic argument (about the discussion of jurisprudential knowledge), dialectical argument (the
debate during the trial, the debate of theoretic cognition) and normative argument (about the explanation of the
application of legal principles and legal provisions) and so on. Dogmatic argument is the fundamental argument
among the three kinds of arguments; it provides the theoretical foundation the other two. Normative argument is the
terminal of the other two arguments, because its application can provide sound rules to protect citizen’s rightful
interests, settle conflicts and disputes for a stable society. Dialectical argument is a link between dogmatic argument
and normative argument. These three arguments have formed a complete system of legal argument. In this system,
there is a great diversity of the evaluation norms for argument, because the claims and pleadings of argument are
various in legal practices.
KEYWORDS: dogmatic argument, dialectical argument, normative argument, evaluation

Every speaker must give reasons for what he or she asserts when asked to do so, unless he or she
can cite reasons which justify a refusal to provide a justification. The rule is called by Alexy
(1989) the general justification rule, which reveals the essential characteristic of legal
argumentation as a kind of practical argument. According to the substantive content and the legal
objectives, legal argument can be divided into dogmatic argument, dialectical argument and
normative argument. Dogmatic argument concerns the expression of jurisprudential knowledge
and the establishment of legal system; dialectical argument is a kind of special debating based on
the dialogue frame during a trial with theoretic cognition; normative argument is about the
explanation of legal principles and legal provisions, its main agent is the judge who applies those
legal norms to legal practice. In the following three parts, we will discuss the three types of
arguments respectively. In part four, we demonstrate the criterions for appraising the three types
of arguments.
1. DOGMATIC LEGAL ARGUMENT
Legal dogmatics is a set of patterns (models) in line with the law that are formed and operated. It
considers a system of value as a matter of doctrine and puts forward claims according to its
interpretation. Alexy (1989) argues that legal dogmatics in a wider sense should contain: (1) the
descriptive-empirical dimension—including the description and prognosis of the practice of the
courts and the determination of the actual will of the legislator; (2) the logical-analytical
dimension such as the analysis of legal concepts and the investigation of the logical relations
between various norms and principles; (3) the normative-practical dimension such as to make
proposals for the interpretation of a norm or for a new norm or a new institution and justify them,
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or criticize a legal decision on grounds of practical shortcomings, and work out a
counter-proposal.
However, legal dogmatics in a narrower sense confines its task to the following three
aspects: logical analysis of legal concepts, integration of this analysis into a system, and
application of the results of this analysis to justify legal decisions. Alexy (1989) holds that legal
dogmatics is a class of propositions which has normative content, relate to enacted norms and
case law, stand in some coherent mutual interrelationship, are composed and discussed in the
framework of an institutionally organized legal science. The premises of dogmatic argument are
dogmatic propositions. The propositions of legal dogmatics include: (1) the definitions of genuine
legal concepts. Legal concepts can be divided into pure legal concepts such as bargains,
administrative conduct, self-defense, and other propositions which are put forward, accepted or
discussed in the framework of law; (2) descriptions and designations of states of affairs; (3)
expressions of principles; (4) norms which lack any statutory pedigree such as the propositions
which are presented with juristic terms by lawyers.
Besides analyzing the structures of dogmatic propositions, the task of dogmatic argument
also includes analysis of the application of dogmatic propositions in justifications, investigation
of the justification and testing of dogmatic propositions, as well as a theory of the function of
dogmatics.
There are two kinds of dogmatic justification: pure dogmatic justification and impure
dogmatic justification (Alexy, 1989). In pure dogmatic justification, the proposition to be justified
follows only from these dogmatic propositions together with empirical propositions, or by the
addition of formulations of positive legal norms. In impure dogmatic justification, there is a need
for general practical arguments in addition to dogmatic arguments. Thus it can be seen that the
general practical propositions are the foundation of the justification of dogmatic propositions.
The procedure of argument was emphasized in Alexy’s discussion on the dogmatic
argument in a framework of rational practical argumentation. Overall, dogmatic argument
emphasizes more on the presentation of legal knowledge, its functions being to interpret and
systematize law. The interpretation of dogmatic argument is mainly about describing theoretically
the categories of legal propositions and their stands, the categories of legal norms and their
validity, legal rules and principles and the distinction between them, the process of justification of
legal interpretation, and legal outcomes. Then, the systematization of legal norms will be carried
out based on the legal interpretation. This legal system includes legal orders and the normative
systems which are composed of legal propositions. Aarnio (1997) considers it as the theoretical
part of the legal dogmatics, while he regards the interpretation as the core of the practical legal
dogmatics. Of course, these two parts are intertwined in dogmatic argument. Without a mass of
knowledge of legal norms, it is impossible to realize the systematization of legal norms. At the
same time, for the entire development of legal knowledge, the system of law provides a
framework for legal interpretation because each interpretation has to be developed in a certain
framework.
2. DIALECTICAL LEGAL ARGUMENT
Dialectical arguments are arguments that contain not only supporting reasons, but attacking
reasons. Dispute must involve two or more agents, because single agent can only perform
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monolog argument. Argument with dispute is called dialectical dialogue in logic. According to
the different functions of participants, the dialogic frameworks can be divided into persuasion,
inquiry, negotiation, information-seeking, deliberation and eristic (Walton, 2002). In the
persuasive dialogue, one of the participants is called proponent of a claim. His task is to justify
the claim persuasively through an admissible argument. The other is called respondent and his
task is to rebut the claim which the proponent puts forward. In order to rebut the claim of the
proponent, the respondent has two methods: one is to rebut the reasons of argument of the
proponent, and the other is to present a new justified claim contradicting the proponent’s claim.
In this case, the proponent has to respond to the respondent’s new claim. Thus it can be seen, in
dialectical argument, it is not enough for arguers only to present their own arguments. They have
to respond to the arguments of the opposing party too. Both parties make mutual arguments in a
dialectical framework for certain aims by using the information of the other party reciprocally.
Grice (1975) called this argument implicature. It is also one of the typical characteristics of
dialectical legal argument. Apart from this, dialectical legal argument has other characteristics: (1)
rational persuasion. Arguers justify their claims through the presentation of reasons or evidence.
(2) adversarial argument. The points of view of both parties are conflicting. Under this
circumstance, the model of argument is adversarial. (3) weighing of reasons. Both parties present
their reasons. Because sometimes they are a Roland for an Oliver, there is a need to weigh their
reasons. (4) goal-oriented actions. Each participant has his goal, and hopes it can be realized
through argument. And generally, there is also a goal to solve the dispute in dialectical arguments.
All actions are developed for these goals. (5) defeasible and fallible conclusions. A claim is
justified at certain stage, but it becomes unjustified because of counterargument at the later stage.
Besides counterargument, sometimes opposing argument emerge. The difference between
opposing argument and counterargument is: opposing argument is an argument that is completely
contradicting the other argument on all the evidences and verdicts. It is the justification of the
negating proposition of the former argumentation. While counterargument is partially
contradictory to the evidence of the former argumentation, it cannot draw the counter-conclusion
against the former one. For example, the proponent puts forward a claim C which is justified by a
fact F, and F is justified by an evidence E. That is to say, argument E├ F is a subargument of F├
C. Then, the opposing argument the respondent should make is the argument with a conclusion
C, and the counterargument the respondent should make is the argument with a conclusion F
(see Figure 1).
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Figure 1 The Comparison between the Opposing argument and Counterargument

According to the different status of participants in dispute, dialectical arguments in law can be
divided into two parts. One of them is on the theoretic cognition of law, and its trait is that there
is no direct substantive juridical relation between the arguer and the conclusion of the argument.
The other is argument in legal practice, and its trait is that there is a direct substantive juridical
relation between the disputant and the conclusion of the argument. In the next two sections, these
two dialectical arguments are described.
2.1 Dialectical Argument on the Theoretic Cognition of Law
Because the cognition of a theory is constrained by the condition of that time, each theory
possesses only a relative stability. Facts show that a sound theory is developed from constant
animadversions. People’s cognition of theory bears the dialectical characteristics, for example,
the dispute between the school of legal positivism and the school of natural law theory during the
19th century. The formation of a theory usually needs a certain periods of time, a few years at
least or decades and even a hundred years, and the theoretic cognition will take an even longer
time.
Theoretic cognition dialectical argument may animadvert on partial deficiency of the
former theoretic cognition, but it seldom completely denies the former theory. It may often
critically perfect the argument on the basis of the former theory instead. Therefore this kind of
argument is also named critical argument. For instance, Hart criticized Austin’s ‘command theory
of law’, which enabled him to come up with the legal systematic theory of ‘rule’. He argued that
some laws were not commands, like marriage, adoption, will, etc. Later on, Hart’s theory was
also criticized by Dworkin. Therefore, the conclusion of this argument is just a conclusion for a
certain period of time.
The lawmaking process in a sense is also a theoretic discussion, so it falls into the scope
of dialectical argument on the theoretic cognition of law. The only difference lies that the
outcome becomes a law instead of a theory.
2.2 Dialectical Argument in Legal Practice

THE THREE TYPES OF AIM-BASED LEGAL ARGUMENTS

311

Dialectical argument in legal practice is mainly about the agents’ rights and obligations. The court
is often a controversial place, as conflicts always exist there. Each party spares no efforts to
present their argument trying to win the judge or the jury. The plaintiff and the defendant are
presumed to raise their most powerful evidence to support their argument. The rule of collection
of evidence, the acceptance of evidence, the burden of proof etc. and other procedural rules
adopted by the court can guarantee the rationality of dialectical argument. In this sense, the
dialectical argument in court has the structure of disputable or absolute arguable
properties—where both parties want to get the upper hand over the other. And because each party
must air its own opinion according to two aspects of reasons: the reasons of fact and the reasons
of law, the dialectical argument in court must handle two kinds of questions, one is the question
of fact, and the other is the question of law.
In the Anglo-America legal system, the finding of fact is the job of the jury. But the
cognizance of fact is not just a factual question, it also involves legal matters. Therefore, the
judges of the continental legal system make their verdicts according to the law of evidence and
the judges of the Anglo-America legal system give the jury restrictive orders before they draw the
decision. Judges in the countries of the continental legal system make factual judgments
according to evidence law, while judges in the countries of the Anglo-America legal system will
give the jury an instruction before they make factual decisions. In many cases, the fact matter and
the law are entangled, so the question is: how to judge what kind of evidence is legally valid? We
know that in the Anglo-America law, it is the judge’s decision; the judge will let the jury handle
only the fact but deal with the matter of law himself.
In the process of fact examination, the plaintiff and defendant argue about the evidence
for his/her own interest. In the original trial, the debate often starts with their accounts of the
same event. Each party tells his or her own story, and the task for the judge or the jury is to
decide the facts. The question of fact disputing in court is legal fact, not the real fact for it can
never be known for sure. The real and impersonal truth is a priori, so that the real fact can only be
sketched out by the rule of evidence, the court procedure, the invention of prejudication, the
lawyering skills and even their eloquence. Besides the limitation of present technical know-how
and lab equipments which hold us back to discover the truth, the weight of manifold values also
makes people forsake truth sometimes. For instance, when judging between the punishment of
crimes and the safeguard of human rights, we cannot make investigations by both fair and foul
means. So to go midway, for the sake of the human rights protection, in the course of fact finding,
the set-up of rules is the necessary obstacle of truth discovery. Another good example is the
system of plea bargaining of America; in order to raise the efficacy of tracing crimes, the suspect
may voluntarily make confession in exchange for the consent for a pettier accusation made by
prosecutor. This is the price has to be paid. We may think it is the compromise the fact has to
make to law, and it shows the dissimilarity between the legal fact and the objective fact. Certainly,
truth in law is also based on its objectivity. Truth in law sometimes can only be presumptive truth.
For example, the presupposition of someone’s birth date is usually based on the records of the
birth-hospital. Therefore, it is the law that decides which facts bring rights and obligations. When
there is a dispute on the facts of a case, the function of legal procedure is to learn what the facts
are, and make them become the assumption of objectivity in adjudication.
Apart from the dispute on the matter of facts, both parties will still debate on the matter of the
application of law, because of, subjectively, the difference in comprehension of the law by both
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parties and objectively, the uncertainty or ambiguity of law. The claims of right of both parties
have not yet been included in the rule of legal language, and even the law can’t imply the
criterion of application itself. Therefore, the only method for both parties is to establish the
relations between his or her claims under the restraint of legal rules with the help of interpreting
the law. The concept of interpretation is in a narrower sense, namely, in the courtroom, the
obligees or the obligors interpreting a rule or a principle in order to realize their claims. The
opposite status of both parties in the courtroom makes the interpretation dialectical, which shows
itself as the dispute over principles and rules. It is also called interpretative argument. Huhn
(2002) maintains that text-based argument and intent-based argument both belong to the
interpretative argument. According to Huhn, legal text forms the backbone of the law. It not only
includes the state constitutions, statutes, municipal ordinances, administrative regulations, and
other public writings that have the force of law, but also includes privately written documents
such as contracts, wills, deeds, checks, and promissory notes, because these privately written
documents also create or alter legal rights. Huhn (2002) puts forward three different methods of
textual interpretation: (1) Interpreting legal text according to its plain meaning; (2) Interpreting
legal text with the help of canons of construction; and (3) Interpreting legal text by means of
intratextual arguments.
The plain meaning method seeks an unambiguous definition of the words of the text. The
canons of construction draw inferences with the meaning of a rule from its textual or legal
context. Intratextual arguments look to the placement of a provision of law with the organization
of a document, or to the use of similar or dissimilar terms in other portions of the document, to
determine the meaning of the provision.
Burton (1995) holds that the interpretation of a statutory text may be drawn from the
following aspects: (1) to read it as a whole to give them coherent meanings, avoiding
contradictions between provisions; (2) to take the legislative history, including the floor debates,
committee reports, and hearings before its enactment into account; (3) to interpret statutes in the
light of legal history, namely, how the common law and other legislatures treated the problem in
other times and places and (4) to interpret statutes in the light of the historical, economic, and
social circumstances at the time of its enactment.
Intentional argument is to conjecture the original purpose of the legislators according to
the existing text. Huhn (2002) reckons that there are three aspects of ascertaining the intentional
evidence: evidence of intent in the text itself, previous versions of the text, the history of the text,
official comments and contemporary commentary.
3. NORMATIVE LEGAL ARGUMENT
Normative arguments are arguments about the way things should be. It tells what people should
do under certain circumstances. In the domain of law, the normative arguments should be
considered as those which tell arbiters how to make juridical decisions correctly and justly. The
argument on the matter of law in court competition provides an optional foundation for applying
the cases. However, the jobs to choose and apply legal norms are not made by the arguers
themselves but by judges. The course that the judge makes the verdict according to the facts and
legal norms is the use of normative argument. A feature of this argument is that the judge has no
substantive interest in the conclusions (verdicts). The procedure of normative argument of judges
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is: first to judge the matter of facts through the dispute of both parties, and then to judge the
matter of law, namely, to judge which party’s opinion on the matter of law is advisable. If neither
opinion is advisable, then the judges have to find the applicable legal norms by themselves.
The main forms of normative argument are text-based argument, precedent-based
argument, convention-based argument and moral argument, etc.
Text-based argument is usually used in simple cases. In simple cases, facts are subsumed
by the law and judges can apply the legal rules or principles to cases directly. This form of
argument is usually used in the countries of continental law, for they have relatively
well–established statutes in these countries.
In law countries, there is a need for judges to apply precedents besides using the
text-based argument. Precedents per se have contained the application of legal principles and
rules. The foundation to apply a precedent is the principle of universalizability. This principle not
only requires the courts to obey the prejudications which were made by themselves, but also to
obey the congeneric prejudications which are made by superior courts. In the face of a precedent,
judges have two choices: one is to adopt it and another is to deviate from it. Alexy (1989)
suggests two rules of applying precedents: (1) if a precedent can be cited in favor of or against a
decision it should be so cited and (2) whoever wishes to depart from a precedent carries the
burden of argument.
As far as the hard cases are concerned, when judges could not find any explicit legal rule,
principle or precedent to adopt, there is a need to consider social conventions. Convention-based
argument is mainly used in countries of common law. Common law is also called customary law
because conventions are allowed to be regarded as the principle of deciding rights. Thus,
convention is also an important source of law. For example, the law of commercial transactions
reflects the transactional convention of people. Moreover, social conventions play a very
important role in distributing tortuous responsibilities.
In legal practice, universal norms can stem from the norms of positive law directly as the
major premises, and can also be obtained through the construction of general principles, ethics,
value and conventions. Therefore, legal normative argument also is related to the matter of ethics.
Moral argument borrows the concept of weltanschauung and most of the moral arguments try to
prove the intrinsic consistency and validity of weltanschauung. There exist not only some basic
moral obligations such as good faith, non-violation of other’s interests and non-interference with
others’ privacy, but some selective moral norms such as caritas, generosity, self-sacrifice, etc. in
the realm of human behaviors. Legal systems apply to all members of society, and require all
members to abide by only the basic ethics. Moral argument which contains a conflict of moral
criteria is called a compound moral argument. It includes doubting moral argument and dilemma
moral argument.
4. EVALUATION OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
The practical characteristics of legal argument make the evaluation not as simple and pure as
logical argument. Legal argument has a non-monotonic form, it is defeasible in nature and its
conclusion is rebuttable. Generally speaking, the criterion of legal argument evaluation is judged
by its acceptability. Different claims of various types of legal argument not only result in the
diversity of the argument forms, but also lead to the discrepancy in the meaning of acceptability.
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4.1 Evaluation of Dogmatic Argument
Alexy argues that there are two rules of appraising dogmatic argument. One is that every
dogmatic proposition must be justified by recourse to at least one general practical argument
whenever it is subjected to doubt. And another is that every dogmatic proposition must be able to
stand up to systematic testing in its narrower and the wider sense (Alexy, 1989). Systematic
testing in the narrower sense is basically to check the logical compatibility of the propositions of
dogmatics, namely, to ask whether the dogmatic propositions and the formulations of legal norms
are logically consistent with one another. In the wider sense, systematic testing is to check the
general practical compatibility of judgments which are justifiable by recourse to a diversity of
dogmatic propositions, namely, to ask whether the decision is justifiable with the help of
dogmatic propositions and legal norms which are consistent with one another from a general
practical perspective (Alexy, 1989). Besides, the dogmatic argument will also comply with the
basic value and aims of law.
4.2 Evaluation of Dialectical Argument
The evaluation of legal dialectical argument is more complex. Toulmin (1958) argued that the
validity of argumentation outside mathematics does not depend on its syntactic structure but on
the disputational process in which they have been defended. According to Toulmin’s view, an
argument is valid if it can stand against dispute. We can say in a sense that legal argument is a
kind of verbal action happening in various occasions. The verbal action can also be called debate.
Moreover, because it involves the correctness of normative proposition, it can be further called
practical debate. Legal argument is a special case of the common practical debate. It does not
require absolute consistency with the disputable normative proposition rationality, but
justification in the frame of a valid system of law.
The appraisal theory of formal dialectical argument does not state its appraisal agent, but
considers that if one party can’t carry on arguing he or she is defeated. This is not the case in
dialectical legal argument, in which the collective and the individual objectives are quite different.
Sometimes there exist several individual objectives; for instance, one party may come up with
several claims. In order to achieve each objective, both parties may argue about its sub-objectives,
so a dialectical argumentation consists of many sub-arguments. To one party, the losses of some
sub ones does not necessarily mean his total defeat of the whole case. Besides, law has set up the
exclusive appraisal agent—the judge or the jury. Theoretically speaking, if both parties strike a
counterbalance during an argument, there will be no win or loss, but it is a different case in legal
argumentation, because of the distribution of the burden to prove, there will be no draws. The one
who shares the burden of proof has the greater probability of losing the argument only because it
is more difficult for him to do so.
For the disputing parties, some basic rules should be abided by: never saying things you
don’t believe in, avoiding ambiguity and irrelevance, being cooperative and keeping to the rule of
procedure, etc. The violation of the above basic rules will result in the abating of the argument’s
acceptability.
Criminal cases and civil cases have different characteristics, because there are different
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proof standards on the judgment of facts. In a criminal case, it is a severe blunder to convict an
innocent man. Therefore, the standard of proof for a criminal case is much stricter than the
standard applied in a civil case.
The target of dialectical argument is the settlement of conflicts. Although each party has
its individual aim of debating, the main factor of the evaluation of a dialectical argument is how
to achieve the collective objective of such an argument on the whole.
4.3 Evaluation of Normative Argument
As a kind of practical argument, legal argument is restricted by existing resources and time.
Dispute should not carry on forever. Judges have to make decisions according to the law in a
valid period. The target of normative argument in the final analysis is to reach correct verdicts
related to collectives, individuals, or public organizations. The theory of probability should be
considered in dealing with the questions of how to get benefits and how to maximize these
benefits. Probability is subjective, for it can be perceived by agents. At the same time, probability
is also normative, because it can be changed into intersubjective a posteriori probability from
subjective a priori probability. A successful practice of law and judging involves ethics,
imagination, common sense, and knowledge in the ways of the world, as well as interpersonal,
rhetorical, political, and other skills, along with an understanding of law and proficiency in legal
reasoning (Burton, 1995). According to the general principle of philosophical cognition, when
one judges what is to be, he or she has to follow the guide of objective truth, otherwise, his or her
judgments will be wrong. According to the requirement of ends of law, when one judges what
ought to be, he or she has to follow the guide of valid normative argument; otherwise his or her
judgments will be wrong. The evaluation criterion of a valid normative argument includes the
following aspects:
(1) Legitimacy. As far as judgments of facts are concerned, the legitimacy of legal
argument mainly means that there should be a foundation of positive law in judging the facts of
the case. As far as legal norms are concerned, the legitimacy of legal argument means that the
legal norms belong to positive law or there should be a foundation of positive law in choosing
legal norms. In the aggregate, legal rules, principles and policies should describe a possible world
to be brought into existence by the coordinated actions of citizens and the states (Burton, 1997).
The law should encourage lofty behavior, discourage bad behavior, and make a more orderly and
fair society. Rules are the basic components of law. Principles are abstract, intrinsic, and essential.
They form the evaluative base of law. For example, in civil cases, although there is not a reason
in rule, the principle of justice is usually adapted to distribute the loss between both parties. Rules
of legal procedure are the formal warrant to realize legal substance norms, such as the burden of
proof, limitation of action, etc. Following legal principles, substantive rules and procedural rules
are the most basic embodiment of the legitimacy of normative argument.
(2) Legal soundness. If we regard the legitimacy of legal argument as finding legal
reasons in present valid law, then, once we step outside present valid law, we have to enter the
category of the requirement of soundness of legal argument. When should a legal decision
(including the verdict of judges) be regarded as sound argument? Because any decision of law
(whether it is a decision of legislation or justice) is necessarily related to the benefits of both
parties, in order to boost up its persuasiveness or admissibility, the decision-maker has to give
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sufficient reasons for his or her decisions. The persuasiveness or admissibility of a legal decision
(or claim) is decided by qualities such as consistency, efficiency, empressement or generalization
of justification.
(3) The value of law. Justice and order are two kinds of basic value of law. Normative
argument should be guided by these two kinds of value.
(4) Social ethics and justice. The judicial verdict not only can reflect social values, but
also helps with the formation of social values through the settlement of the dispute. A normative
argument is admissible if its conclusion coincides with the common value system of law.
(5) Valid legal reasoning. The reasoning of normative legal argument must be valid.
In a word, it is impossible for the conclusion of the normative argument to be absolutely
right. If a normative argument can be rationally justified under valid legal orders (such as
following legal rules, precedents and legal dogmatics), then it is correct.
SUMMARY
No matter what type of argument is applied in legal practice, the rationality and correctness of the
argument will be ultimately embodied through the ‘acceptability’ of the legal argumentation
verdict. In this way, the justification of law becomes the common process of legal issues by
reason, dialogue, consultation and argument of all the parties concerned. We attach great
importance to the audience and make it the starting point of legal justification. The aim of legal
argumentation is to achieve equity, justness and honesty by way of correct or rational
argumentation techniques and the relative rules through which the convincing verdict is drawn.
Legal argumentation achieves its own goal while further achieving the aims the law tries to reach.
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